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Abstract
Exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages decline over a period of unemploy-
ment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved
heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that
the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities
and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unem-
ployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies
on performance-related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input
that is complementary to worker skills.
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I. Introduction
It is well documented that exit rates from unemployment and wages from
re-employment decline with the duration of unemployment, after control-
ling for worker observable characteristics. Since Lancaster (1979) and
Heckman and Singer (1984), the empirical literature has emphasized that
ex ante unobserved heterogeneity (or sorting) accounts for a large part of
the decline in exit rates. According to this explanation, workers differ in
terms of certain time-invariant characteristics, which are unobservable to
the econometrician and potentially to recruiting firms, and this translates
into differences in employment prospects. As a result, the average exit
rates fall with the duration of unemployment because of variation in the
composition of the unemployed. Despite its quantitative importance, very
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little theoretical research has been performed to address this explanation.
Lockwood (1991) was a remarkable early exception, but re-employment
wages were assumed to be constant in this study. Gonzalez and Shi (2010)
and Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat (2014) provided theoretical explana-
tions of the duration dynamics of one of these two variables, but they were
not conclusive about the other variable. Furthermore, the explanation of
sorting in these three studies was somewhat circular because worker het-
erogeneity was modeled based on exogenous differences in the likelihood
of obtaining a job.
We consider a sorting mechanism based on productivity differences
across workers, which is consistent with falling exit rates and wages. We
analyze a frictional labor market in which workers are informed privately
about skills and search is directed. These skills are treated as abilities that
recruiters cannot grasp either from a CV or an interview, but they can be
assessed on the job. An adverse selection problem arises if unskilled work-
ers crowd out skilled applicants. Thus, firms design self-selection schemes
in equilibrium to separate worker types in different submarkets. The sort-
ing mechanism relies on two ingredients. First, in the absence of screening
devices, performance-contingent compensation plans are a central feature
of these sorting schemes, as noted in the literature regarding personnel eco-
nomics (e.g., Lazear and Shaw, 2007). In our study, performance-related
pay is derived from the assumption that rents generated by a job–worker
pair are split according to some exogenous rule. Second, firms have the
ability to commit to renting an input that is complementary in terms of
production to the skills of workers. We refer to that production input as
capital or machine quality.1 These linear renting costs together with the
concavity of the production technology mean that the surplus generated by
a firm–worker pair is hump-shaped in capital.
Firms are ex ante identical. In equilibrium, a mass of firms commits
to renting the machine quality that maximizes the surplus derived from a
match with an unskilled worker. Likewise, a continuum of firms commits
to machines with higher quality because they and skilled workers anticipate
that their match would produce a larger surplus, and thus higher wages and
profits. Higher expected profits attract a relatively higher number of firms,
so they are associated with higher exit rates from unemployment. Therefore,
the average exit rate from unemployment and the average re-employment
wage fall with duration because of the variation in the composition of the
unemployment pool.
1 We interpret machine quality in a generic manner as any set of inputs that are comple-
mentary in terms of production to unobservable skills. For example, this set could contain
co-workers, physical capital, and software (to the extent that the documented complementari-
ties with the observable characteristics of the labor input, mainly education, can be extended
to the unobservable characteristics), or intermediate goods.
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It should be noted that because of the asymmetric information assump-
tion and the hump shape of the surplus function, unskilled workers face
a trade-off between the more job opportunities that the skilled submarket
offers and the higher wages they might obtain in the unskilled submarket.
In this setting, ex ante commitment and directed search are crucial for
market segmentation because firms that target skilled workers can increase
the machine quality if necessary to discourage the unskilled from applying.
This occurs because capital–skill complementarity ensures that the losses
associated with the capital increase are larger for unskilled workers, thereby
leaving the skilled as the only applicants.
The present study makes novel contributions in several areas. We build
on Peters (1991) and Moen (1997) by extending the competitive search
literature to an economy in which firms commit to machine quality instead
of wage contracts. Moreover, this paper analyzes the equilibrium allocation
and its efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information, for example,
similar to Michelacci and Suarez (2006) and Guerrieri et al. (2010). Related
research is discussed in Section II.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III,
we describe the economy. The equilibrium is characterized in Section IV.
In Section V, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes. In Section VI, we
present our conclusions. Finally, the proofs are provided in the Appendix
and supplementary material is presented in an Online Appendix.
II. Related Literature
As mentioned above, other studies have also utilized a sorting mechanism to
address the negative duration dependence of exit rates and re-employment
wages. In Lockwood (1991), workers are also privately informed about
their types, but firms have access to an imperfect screening technology.
To the best of our knowledge, this random search model was the first
investigation of a pure sorting mechanism in exit rates, although wages
were assumed to remain constant in duration. Gonzalez and Shi (2010)
and Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat (2014) considered economies with
symmetric incomplete information regarding worker skills and learning
from unemployment duration in a competitive search framework. In these
settings, the mechanisms at work combined state-dependence and sorting
effects. The exit rates did not necessarily fall with duration in the former,
whereas wages might not be monotonic in the latter. Alternative mecha-
nisms analyzed in previous studies belong to the category known as state
dependence. For example, Pissarides (1992) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2008) modeled human capital depreciation and search discouragement,
while the deterioration in social networks during unemployment was ana-
lyzed in Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
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We build on the influential work of Peters (1991) and Moen (1997) by
analyzing a model of the labor market where firms commit to machine
quality instead of wage contracts to attract applicants, and workers direct
their own search. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) also analyzed an economy
in which firms announce capital investment and wages are bargained during
meetings, but with identical workers.
The present study contributes to research into asymmetric information
in the labor market by exploring the dynamic consequences of capital–skill
complementarity as well as performance-based pay schemes. In a static
setting, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) allowed firms to post either single-
wage job offers or wage-bargaining vacancies. We do not allow firms
to commit to single wages in the benchmark, but we inspect alternative
contracting spaces and constrained efficiency in the Online Appendix. In
Gale (1992) and Guerrieri et al. (2010), workers self-selected according to
the disutility of work. The former found that good workers work more hours
and are better paid in the absence of frictions. The latter showed that this
result does not extend directly to a frictional labor market because workers
with a lower disutility from working have a higher employability rate,
although wages and working time comparisons were based on additional
assumptions.
Furthermore, the set of assumptions employed by Guerrieri et al. (2010)
does not hold in our model. In particular, their sorting assumption dis-
qualifies any pooling contract from being part of an equilibrium allocation
as firms can always deviate and deliver an arbitrarily small utility gain
to the skilled workers and a strictly lower utility to the unskilled. Instead,
in our setting, pooling contracts do not participate in the equilibrium be-
cause firms can increase profits by deviating to a higher machine quality,
thereby attracting only skilled applicants even if the skilled also obtain
utility losses.
In terms of constrained efficiency, under perfect information, Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) found that maximum welfare is attained in the market
economy when firms commit to capital and wages are negotiated if the
Hosios condition holds, whereas Shi (2001) showed that the equilibrium
is constrained efficient if firms can post type-contingent offers. By con-
trast, with asymmetric information, the equilibrium was not constrained
efficient when the labor market was segmented in Michelacci and Suarez
(2006). In agreement with Guerrieri et al. (2010), we find that unskilled
workers are detrimental to skilled workers if firms over-invest to discour-
age unskilled workers from applying for skilled jobs, which pushes down
the skilled wages and exit rates. A similar outcome was also reported in
Moen (2003) and Moen and Rosen (2005). The former analyzed a labor
market with individual- and match-specific productivity where firms only
observed the overall productivity. In this setting, if firms cannot commit to
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productivity-contingent wages, there are too few skilled jobs posted in
equilibrium and, although the wage premium for skilled workers is larger
than optimal, their welfare reduces. The latter study considered a friction-
less economy with asymmetric information where firms offer performance-
based pay to make workers invest greater effort in their jobs. They showed
that the equilibrium is separating, but not efficient, because too much effort
is induced in skilled jobs to separate types.
In contrast to previous research into assortative matching, the capital–
skill complementarity assumption is sufficient to derive positive assorta-
tive matching (PAM) in equilibrium, which is crucial for achieving falling
wages in equilibrium. Shimer and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher
(2010) showed that PAM requires stronger complementarity in a frictional
economy. This was also the case for Shi (2001) in a setting similar to
ours, although with perfect information on agent types and the capital in-
vestments made prior to matching. In Section V, we argue that a crucial
difference compared with these previous studies is that capital costs are
incurred only while producing.
III. The Model
In this section, a frictional economy with heterogeneous workers and asym-
metric information about the worker type is described.
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a measure one of
workers and a large continuum of ex ante identical firms. Free entry deter-
mines the mass of active firms in equilibrium. Workers differ in their mar-
ket skills. They can be either unskilled (type ) or skilled (type h). There
is a mass μ(s) of type-s workers for s ∈ {, h} and μ() + μ(h) = 1. The
worker type is unobservable to the recruiting firms prior to production, but
it can be assessed on the job. Workers and firms are risk neutral and future
payoffs are discounted at a common rate r . The flow utility of unmatched
workers is normalized to 0. Because of the focus on the steady-state equi-
librium, time indices are suppressed for notational simplicity. Let us denote
the unemployment rate of type-s workers at any instant.
Production
At any point in time, job–worker pairs with a machine of quality k produce
F(k, s) − ck units of net output, where c > 0 is the operating cost per
quality unit. The following assumptions are imposed on the production
technology.
1. Capital is an essential input, F(0, s) = 0.
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2. The function F is increasing and concave in k. Note that the mono-
tonicity and concavity of function F , together with the linear variable
costs, make the net output a hump-shaped function of k.
3. Skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers for any
machine quality, i.e., F(k, ) < F(k, h) for k > 0.
4. The following standard limit conditions hold:
lim
k→0
Fk(k, s) = ∞ and lim
k→∞
Fk(k, s) = 0.
5. Capital and skills are complementary in production, i.e., Fk(k, ) <
Fk(k, h).
To allow agents to engage in search and production activities, it is
assumed that some value k exists such that the net output F(k, ) − ck is
sufficiently large relative to the effective vacancy costs. Later, it is useful
to refer to k¯s as the solution of the equation Fk(k, s) = c, for s ∈ {, h}.
The assumptions on the production function F ensure the existence and
uniqueness of a solution to that equation, and that k¯ < k¯h . Note that k¯s
maximizes the net output produced by a type-s worker.
Search and Matching: Bargaining
Firms create a job at cost c0 > 0. If a vacancy is filled, then a surplus S
is generated due to the matching frictions detailed below. We consider that
wages are set ex post through Nash bargaining, but it is sufficient for now
to assume a constant labor share of the surplus, α. As in Michelacci and
Suarez (2006), we treat this as an institutional feature, and thus it is not
contractible.2 However, in contrast to their setting, firms have the ability
to commit to renting a machine quality k to attract workers. Therefore,
vacancies are identified by the machine quality. There are infinitely many
submarkets k ∈ K.3 A submarket where the firms and workers seek a
trading partner is said to be active. Let K ⊂ K denote the subset of active
submarkets.
Let q(k) denote the ratio of workers relative to the vacancies created in
submarket k. This is referred to as the expected queue length for submarket
k. This ratio must be consistent with the optimizing behavior of the agents.
Job-seekers and vacant firms rationally anticipate the wage linked to the
committed capital k. Search is directed in the sense that workers are fully
informed about vacancies and they apply for jobs that maximize their ex-
pected utility. Agents rationally anticipate that higher wages are associated
2 We discuss alternative contracting environments in the Online Appendix.
3 As an abuse of language, but for the sake of notational simplicity, the letter k is used to
refer indistinctly to the machine quality and its associated submarket.
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with higher job-filling rates and lower job-finding rates. Note that because
of the inverted-U shape of the net output, higher machine qualities do not
translate monotonically into higher wages.
A firm fills its vacancy at the Poisson rate η[q(k)]. In submarket k,
workers of either type find jobs at rate ν[q(k)] because of the assumption
of asymmetric information regarding the applicants’ skills. The equality
ν[q(k)] = η[q(k)]/q(k) results from the fact that there is the same num-
ber of newly employed workers as newly filled jobs at any instant. To
improve readability, the reference to the submarket is omitted, unless it is
necessary. A number of standard assumptions on the matching rates are
made. Function η is increasing in q, which indicates that it is easier to
fill jobs in submarkets with more applicants per vacancy. Symmetrically,
ν is decreasing in queue length to capture the intuition that finding a job
is more difficult when workers are more abundant relative to vacancies.
Furthermore, η and ν are twice continuously differentiable functions, and
the elasticity of the job-finding probability, ζ (q), is an increasing function
of the ratio. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, the following
standard boundary conditions are assumed:
lim
q→∞ η(q) = limq→0 ν(q) = ∞ and limq→0 η(q) = limq→∞ ν(q) = 0.
Furthermore, γ (k, s) is defined as the share of applicants of type s who
search for jobs in submarket k ∈ K. Let (k) ≡ [γ (k, ), γ (k, h)] be a point
of the simplex 	1.
Timing
The timing of the events is as follows. At the beginning of each instant,
firms hold one job, which can be either vacant or filled. Workers are either
employed or unemployed. There is potentially a continuum of submarkets
indexed by a machine quality k. Vacant firms enter a submarket to locate
their vacancy. Then, unemployed workers choose a submarket to search for
a job. Matching, production, and wage negotiation occur. Job-termination
shocks are idiosyncratic and they hit active pairs at the Poisson rate λ. The
worker becomes unemployed and the firm vanishes when shocks occur.
Value Functions
An unemployed worker of type s chooses the submarket that maximizes
their utility. They become employed at rate ν(q) and obtain the value
αSs(k):
rUs = max
k
ν[q(k)]αSs(k). (1)
7
The surplus Ss(k) comprises the flow output net of the operating costs,
as well as the net of the search option if they are unemployed. This satisfies
the following functional equation:
(r + λ)Ss(k) = F(k, s) − ck − rUs . (2)
Firms choose a submarket to post their vacancies and maximize the
expected profits. A firm incurs a one-time cost of c0 when posting a
vacancy in submarket k. The job is filled by a worker of type s with
probability η[q(k)]γ (k, s). Then, the returns from a filled vacancy are
(1 − α)Ss(k). Thus, the value of a vacant firm is defined by
rV = −c0 + η[q(k)]
∑
s
γ (k, s)(1 − α)Ss(k). (3)
Furthermore, the expected profits must be zero in any active submarket in
equilibrium because of free entry, V = 0.
IV. Equilibrium
We now define the steady-state equilibrium, which is a natural extension
of the equilibrium concept defined in the competitive search literature.
We build upon the study of Guerrieri et al. (2010). Note that rational
expectations for job offers off the equilibrium path must also be set to help
recruiting firms maximize their profits. Thus, the queue length Q(k) and
type distribution (k) must be defined for any submarket k ∈ K.
Definition 1. A steady-state equilibrium consists of utility values {Us}s ,
surplus functions Ss : K → R+, a set of active submarkets K ⊂ K, a dis-
tribution G of vacancies across submarkets with support K , a queue length
function Q : K → R+, and a type-share function  : K → 	1 such that
the following apply.
1. The surplus value Ss satisfies the functional equation (2).
2. Profit-maximization condition and free-entry condition:
∀k ∈ K, η[Q(k)]
∑
s
γ (k, s)(1 − α)Ss(k) ≤ c0;
and with equality if k ∈ K.
3. Workers search optimally for jobs. For all s ∈ {, h},
rUs = max
k∈K
ν[Q(k)]αSs(k), and ν[Q(k)]αSs(k) ≤ rUs, ∀k ∈ K.
Furthermore, if k is such that γ (k, s) > 0 and Q(k) > 0, then
ν[Q(k)]αSs(k) = rUs. If Ss(k) < 0, then either Q(k) = 0 or γs(k) = 0.
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4. Resource constraint for labor:∫
K
γ (k, s)Q(k)dG(k) = usμ(s), ∀s ∈ {, h}.
Firms set a job and choose a machine quality to maximize their prof-
its. Because of free entry, the expected discounted profits are zero in
equilibrium. Workers direct their search to maximize their expected dis-
counted utility. The last condition ensures that, for a given type, the sum
of job seekers across submarkets equals the total mass of unemployed.
The third equilibrium condition determines the rational expectations
about the probability of filling a vacancy off the equilibrium path. The
expected number of applicants per firm in an inactive submarket is deter-
mined by the maximum queue length that allows each type of worker to
obtain their market utility Us . Let us use a trembling-hand type of argument
to provide an intuition. Consider an arbitrarily small mass of firms, which
deviate from the equilibrium allocation and post their vacancies in sub-
market k /∈ K . These firms form rational expectations about Q(k), γ (k, ),
and γ (k, h). Suppose that skilled workers are better off by applying to
submarket k relative to all of the other active submarkets with the queue
length that allows the unskilled to obtain their market utility U at k. Then,
there would be a larger inflow of skilled applicants to submarket k. This
would reduce the expected utility obtained at k by the unskilled below U.
As a result, skilled workers would be the only applicants to these deviating
firms. Note that this notion is a natural extension of the subgame perfection
condition assumed in the competitive search framework with homogeneous
workers.
Characterization of the Equilibrium
Next, the equilibrium allocation is characterized. First, it is shown that
an equilibrium where both types of worker apply to the same vacancies
cannot exist. Then, the existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium
is proved. All of the proofs are given in the Appendix.
Consider a submarket k where skilled workers are willing to apply. The
following lemma states that the surplus generated by skilled workers with
machines of quality k is larger than that generated by the unskilled.
Lemma 1. Let k be a submarket such that γ (k, ) ≥ 0, γ (k, h) > 0, and
Q(k) > 0. Then, S(k) < Sh(k).
From S(k) < Sh(k), it follows that the firm value obtained from hiring
a type- worker in this submarket is lower than that when filling the
vacancy with a type-h worker. As a result, Lemma 1 partially resembles
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Fig. 1. Surplus as a function of capital
the monotonicity assumption in Guerrieri et al. (2010), according to which
the principals (firms) always prefer to trade with higher types.
Proposition 1 states that workers of different types cannot apply for the
same jobs in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There is no equilibrium in which workers of different types
search for jobs in the same submarket. Thus, for all active submarkets
k ∈ K, either γ (k, ) = 1 and γ (k, h) = 0, or vice versa.
To understand this result, Figure 1 shows the surplus as a function of
capital for each type of worker. Recall that the surplus has an inverted-
U shape in k because of the monotonicity and concavity of the flow
output as well as the linear costs that firms incur when operating. Lemma
1 implies that the skilled surplus stands above its unskilled counterpart
for the subset of capital qualities of interest. If a submarket k1 is active
at equilibrium with γ (k1, ), γ (k1, h) > 0, then committing to capital k ′
arbitrarily above k1 would be a profitable deviation. By entering submarket
k ′, firms can eliminate the unskilled applicants, thereby achieving a discrete
jump in profits. This is the case because unskilled workers would need to
be compensated with a higher job-finding rate in k ′ relative to k1 due
to their surplus fall, whereas the expected queue length that makes the
skilled indifferent is indeed higher in k ′ than in k1. Thus, this argument is
similar to the sorting assumption in Guerrieri et al. (2010), where firms
can always find a way to locally increase the utility of the skilled and make
the unskilled worse off to sort them out. However, this sorting assumption
does not hold for a submarket k2 > k¯h . Note that firms make both types
either worse or better off when deviating from submarket k2. However,
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the intuition derived from the equilibrium definition is that the relative
rather than the absolute utility gains and losses are important. Thus, by
deviating to submarket k ′ arbitrarily above k2, firms can again screen out
the unskilled because capital–skill complementarity implies that the surplus
fall is relatively larger for the unskilled, and thus they must be compensated
with a shorter queue length to make them indifferent.
As a result, if an equilibrium exists, it must be separating. The existence
and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium is demonstrated. Given the pair
(U,Uh), problem (Ps) is defined as
sup
q,k
ν(q)αSs(k)
subj. to η(q)(1 − α)Ss(k) ≥ c0,
ν(q)αS−s(k) ≤ rU−s,
where function Ss is defined by equation (2). The solution to this problem
maximizes the unemployment value of the type-s worker subject to firms
making non-negative profits, as in the standard characterization of the
competitive search equilibrium allocation. However, the separating feature
of the equilibrium requires one extra constraint. The last inequality is the
non-participation condition for type-s workers because they must have no
incentive to apply to submarket of type s. As is shown in Section V, the
non-participation condition for type-h workers in problem (P) does not
bind. Therefore, the problem (P) can be rewritten without this constraint.
Proposition 2 shows that an equilibrium allocation is a solution of the set
of problems (Ps)s , and vice versa.
Proposition 2. A unique separating equilibrium exists. The equilibrium
set of active submarkets K ≡ {k, kh} and the respective queue lengths q
and qh are determined by the following conditions
k = k¯, (4)
c0 = η(q)(1 − α) F(k, ) − ck
r + λ + αν(q) , (5)
c0 = η(qh)(1 − α) F(kh, h) − ckh
r + λ + αν(qh) , (6)
and
kh = k¯h, if ν(qh)αS(kh) ≤ rU; (7)
otherwise,
kh > k¯h and ν(qh)αS(kh) = rU. (8)
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Fig. 2. Two possible separating equilibrium allocations
Proposition 2 states that a unique equilibrium exists. There are two
possible types of equilibrium allocations, which are shown in Figure 2.
In both submarkets, firm entry is determined by the corresponding zero-
profit conditions (5) and (6). We plot the firms’ zero-profit curves and
the indifference curves for unemployed workers. Lemma 1 and the zero-
profit condition imply that the zero-profit curve for skilled workers remains
above that of its unskilled counterpart if the skilled are willing to apply
to the submarket in question. Likewise, the capital–skill complementarity
assumption is a single-crossing property, and thus the indifference curves
cross only once.
First, consider the case of unskilled workers. According to equilibrium
condition (4), unskilled workers apply to the submarket characterized by the
machine quality k¯. This result is intuitive because k¯ maximizes the surplus
created by a match with an unskilled worker, and both firms and unskilled
workers benefit from the maximum surplus. Graphically, the equilibrium
allocation corresponds to the tangency point between the zero-profit curve
and the indifference curve because the non-participation condition does not
bind in the unskilled case. In other words, unskilled workers sign up for
the same job offer, as in the scenario with no informational frictions.
Next, the skilled submarket is considered. First, if unskilled workers are
not willing to apply to submarket k¯h , firms that target skilled workers aim
to maximize the surplus from the match. Similar to the unskilled case,
this allocation corresponds to the tangency point depicted in the left panel
of Figure 2. This equilibrium allocation coincides with that with perfect
information and type-contingent offers. Second, if the non-participation
condition in problem (Ph) binds, condition (8) implies that the equilibrium
capital kh > k¯h . The right panel of Figure 2 shows this second case. As in
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Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), and Guerrieri et al. (2010),
this is the minimum cost required to screen out unskilled applicants because
it makes them indifferent with respect to the equilibrium submarket k¯. The
forgone welfare is accounted for by the capital difference kh − k¯h , which we
refer to in the following as over-investment, and the firm entry difference.
Likewise, the forgone expected wages can be treated as the burden created
by the presence of unskilled workers on the skilled. This result agrees with
Moen (2003) and Moen and Rosen (2005).
The result showing the existence of a separating equilibrium is not new
and it relies on the matching frictions as well as the capital–skill comple-
mentarity assumption. In particular, because screening out unskilled work-
ers may require skilled agents to forgo some of their potential returns to
matching, a deviation by firms (to a pooling submarket) that leads to a
reduction in these forgone returns might be tempting and it could break
the separating equilibrium. This was the case described in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). However, similar to Guerrieri et al. (2010), these deviations
are not profitable in the present case. To understand this, we simply need to
determine what type of applicants might apply to the deviating firms in a
submarket k ′ ∈ (k¯h, kh). Note that unskilled workers are indifferent between
equilibrium submarket k¯ and kh (i.e., the queue length qh and capital kh
maximize the search value of both types). Therefore, we need to determine
who benefits the most from applying to submarket k ′. By differentiating
expression (1) with respect to k and evaluating it at kh , we obtain
∂qs
∂k
|k=kh =
ν(qh)
ν ′(qh)
−Fk(kh, s) + c
Ss(kh)(r + λ) , for s ∈ {, h}. (9)
Lemma 1 implies that S(kh) < Sh(kh). Furthermore, Fk(kh, ) − c <
Fk(kh, h) − c < 0 due to capital–skill complementarity. As a result, 0 >
∂qh/∂k|k=kh > ∂q/∂k|k=kh when deviating to k ′. Thus, the skilled workers
benefit the least (their surplus increases relatively less) if they apply to
submarket k ′. Therefore, the queue length must increase relatively less to
make them indifferent with respect to kh . As a result, only the unskilled
apply to the deviating submarket k ′; hence, this cannot be a profitable
deviation.
What Leads to Over-Investment?
As described above, we have shown that over-investment (kh − k¯h) can
occur at equilibrium. This result is interesting because it is an inefficient
outcome, as is shown in the Online Appendix. Some of the key forces that
underlie over-investment are now considered.
Proposition 2 states that type-h firms over-invest in machine quality at
equilibrium if and only if the unskilled are better off searching for a job
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Fig. 3. The equilibrium condition for over-investment for an economy with Cobb–Douglas
production technology and an urn-ball matching function
with machine quality k¯h . Thus, over-investment occurs at equilibrium if
and only
ν(q¯h)S(k¯h) > ν(q¯)S(k¯), (10)
where q¯s is defined by the equation
c0 = η(q¯s)(1 − α) F(k¯s, s) − ck¯s
r + λ + αν(q¯s) .
As Proposition 3 in the next section states, this may not be the case
because of higher wages, but instead because of the greater number of job
opportunities workers have in the skilled submarket. Whether this inequality
holds or not depends on the functional forms and the parameter values. In
particular, it depends on the skill difference, the capital elasticity of the
production function, and the job-finding probability function. The following
lemma states that firms over-invest at equilibrium if the skill difference is
sufficiently small because the potential employment gains from applying
for type-h jobs are of a higher order than the associated wage losses.4
Lemma 2. Over-investment occurs at equilibrium if the skill difference is
sufficiently small.
More generally, Figure 3 illustrates the case for a Cobb–Douglas
production technology, F(k, a) = kσa1−σ , where σ ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ {a, ah}
4 The authors thank a referee for drawing our attention to this point.
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denotes the market skills of the employee, and a Cobb–Douglas match-
ing function, ν(q) = qα−1. We obtain k¯s = as(σ/c)1/(1−σ ), for s ∈ {, h}.
The machine quality k¯s increases with the skills and decreases with the
operating cost, whereas the effects of the capital elasticity σ are uncertain.
Condition (10) becomes
ν(q¯h)(r + λ) + αν(q¯)ν(q¯h)
ν(q¯)(r + λ) + αν(q¯)ν(q¯h)
F(k¯h, ) − ck¯h
F(k¯, ) − ck¯
> 1. (11)
The first factor in this expression is greater than 1 because skilled jobs
are relatively more abundant, whereas the second factor is lower than 1
because k¯ is the surplus-maximizing level. Whether or not this product
is above 1 depends on the parameter values. Figure 3 plots this product
for several values of the skill difference ah − a and capital elasticity σ .
Over-investment occurs mostly for low values of the capital elasticity and
skill differences. Our intuition regarding capital elasticity is that the wage
penalization associated with applying for jobs of quality k¯h increases as
the firms’ reaction through the capital margin becomes more important.
Furthermore, the occurrence of over-investment at equilibrium is generally
not monotonic in the skill difference, as shown for σ = 0.6.
V. Exit Rates and Re-Employment Wages
The equilibrium outcomes are now considered, particularly the dynamics
of the exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages over the
unemployment duration. All of the proofs are given in the Appendix.
After matching, the wages are Nash-bargained. Let α denote the bar-
gaining power of the worker. In the Appendix, the equilibrium wages are
derived, which are
ws = α[F(ks, s) − cks] + (1 − α)rUs . (12)
In addition to their continuation value of unemployment, workers obtain a
share α of the surplus. The following proposition states that skilled workers
have better employment prospects on all dimensions compared with their
unskilled counterparts.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium machine quality, job-finding rate, surplus,
unemployment value, and wage are higher for skilled workers.
The returns obtained by skilled workers from searching in the type-
submarket are strictly lower than the returns from searching in the skilled
submarket. Therefore, the non-participation constraint in problem (P) does
not bind, as had been speculated when characterizing the equilibrium al-
location. By contrast, unskilled workers face a trade-off when considering
whether to apply for skilled jobs. First, skilled jobs are relatively more
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abundant and, second, the net output produced by operating with a ma-
chine quality is above k¯, and thus wages are lower. Firms that target
skilled workers use the capital margin to discourage unskilled workers from
applying, if necessary. This may imply that there is a burden on skilled
workers in terms of excessive capital, but their employment prospects are
always relatively better.
Wage Differences
The equilibrium wage difference can be derived from expression (12). Note
that wage differences among observationally identical workers are not de-
rived simply from differences in the worker unobservable characteristics.
An amplification mechanism occurs at equilibrium due to the reaction
of ex ante identical profit-maximizing firms to worker differences. First,
firms commit to a higher machine quality to attract (only) skilled workers.
Second, the expected returns from posting vacancies in the skilled submar-
ket outweigh those in the unskilled submarket, so firm entry is greater in
the former. As a result, the exit rates from unemployment, and thus the
outside options of the skilled workers, are higher.
Dynamics over the Duration of Unemployment
The steady-state unemployment rate of workers of type s ∈ {, h} is deter-
mined by
us = λ
λ + ν(qs) . (13)
Proposition 3 implies that the unemployment rate of skilled workers is
lower. The dynamics of the equilibrium variables over the duration of
unemployment are now investigated. Let the length of an unemployment
spell be denoted by τ ∈ (0,∞). The average job-finding rate at duration τ
is derived as the ratio of the mass of workers who find a job immediately
after a period of length τ relative to the total mass of unemployed for a
period of this length. The average wage for new matches conditional on an
unemployment period of length τ is obtained in an analogous manner.
Proposition 4. The average job-finding rates and re-employment wages
decline with the duration of unemployment, and they flatten out for long
periods. If μ(h) ≤ 0.5, then the rate at which exit rates fall also declines
with duration.
Proposition 4 states that these two variables decline over an unemploy-
ment period despite constant individual rates and wages. This falling trend
is due to a pure sorting effect. The ex ante differences across workers
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affect output directly. Because of the performance-related pay schemes,
firms can separate different types of workers into different submarkets by
committing to an input that is complementary in terms of production to
the workers’ skills. Skilled workers are more likely to exit unemployment
as well as obtaining higher wages. Therefore, the average worker is more
likely to be unskilled when the unemployment duration is longer. Two other
implications are derived from the pure sorting mechanism. First, both the
average exit rates and re-employment wages flatten out for sufficiently long
periods. Second, because they are functions of the unemployment duration,
these variables are either convex or they begin as concave and then be-
come convex after some duration, where the inflection point depends on
the parameter values. In particular, a sufficient condition for the rate of
the decline of the exit rate to decrease steadily over the duration of unem-
ployment is that the mass of skilled workers is less than half of the total
population in the economy.
The empirical evidence for exit rates is robust in terms of these three
features: they fall with the duration of unemployment at a declining rate,
and flatten out for long spells (see Shimer, 2008; Farber and Valletta, 2013).
A number of studies have established the negative relationship between
re-employment wages and unemployment duration (see Addison et al.,
2004; Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat, 2014). However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no clear evidence for wages regarding the other
two features.
Although alternative mechanisms might also be consistent with the em-
pirical falling trends in these two variables, they might be at odds with the
decreasing decline in exit rates. For example, although little is known about
the precise process that rules the depreciation of human capital over the
duration of unemployment, in Machin and Manning (1999), it was stated
that “an educated guess might be that productivity falls slowly initially
but there is then a period in which deterioration is rather rapid and then
it bottoms out.” Under this assumption, the exit rates and re-employment
wages will follow productivity. A similar pattern is likely to occur if the
mechanism at work is the deterioration of the social network of an unem-
ployed worker; see, for example, figure 6 in Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson
(2004).
Positive Assortative Matching and Wages
The unobserved heterogeneity explanation is consistent with both falling
exit rates and wages over the duration of unemployment if the workers who
leave unemployment sooner also obtain higher wages. Therefore, PAM is a
key equilibrium outcome. However, it is a robust result in previous research
into assignment, where capital–skill complementarity is not sufficient to
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produce PAM in a frictional economy. In a random search framework,
Shimer and Smith (2000) showed that PAM requires log-supermodularity.
Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) found that a weaker (root-supermodularity)
condition is necessary and sufficient for PAM in a competitive search
economy. Shi (2001) also demonstrated that fairly strong complementarity
is needed in a world closer to ours, but where there is perfect informa-
tion about worker types and firms differentiate themselves by investing in
capital, which is a sunk cost at the meeting stage. The requirement for
strong complementarity in competitive search models is due to the trade-
off between the complementarity in production and the complementarity in
securing the match. Thus, high-value workers (buyers) find that it is op-
timal at equilibrium to match with low-value firms (sellers) if there is no
complementarity in production (trade). This is the case because the former
accept a low wage (high price) to increase the matching chances, whereas
the latter are more willing to make business through wages (prices) at the
risk of remaining idle. Simple supermodularity is not sufficient to outweigh
these preferences.
The fundamental difference in our setting is that the sunk costs c0 do not
depend on the machine quality to which firms commit and the operating
costs c are only incurred if the job is filled.5 To understand this, we
consider the perfect information scenario analyzed in Shi (2001), but with
our cost assumptions. The capital decision is then determined by the first-
order condition Fk(k, s) = c. It follows that capital–skill complementarity
is sufficient to obtain PAM because of the assumption that the cost scheme
breaks the link between machine quality and search decisions. Thus, there
are no high- or low-type firms ex ante, but there are different match values
ex post, and the capital decision maximizes the joint value of the worker–
firm pair. Clearly, adverse selection can restore the link between capital and
the search for skilled jobs. However, in this case, Proposition 2 states that
the machine quality is always higher for skilled jobs to prevent unskilled
workers from applying, and Proposition 3 shows that private information
does not reverse the order for exit rates and wages.
VI. Conclusions
This paper models a sorting mechanism based on adverse selection to
explain the declining exit rates from unemployment and re-employment
wages over the duration of unemployment. The central assumptions of our
5 As stated in the introduction, capital is treated as any input that is complementary in pro-
duction to worker skills such as co-worker skills, machine quality, or the quantity and quality
of intermediate goods. Therefore, the associated costs are variable instead of fixed. However,
because of its centrality, alternative cost schemes are studied in the Online Appendix.
C©
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model are as follows. First, workers are informed privately about their
skills. Second, recruiting firms can commit to an input (e.g., capital) that
is complementary in terms of production with worker skills. Third, firms
have the ability to set performance-related pay schemes. Fourth, the search
is directed.
In this setting, different types of workers search for a job in different
submarkets at equilibrium. Skilled workers look for jobs with higher ma-
chine quality, experience more job opportunities, and obtain higher wages
than their unskilled counterparts (i.e., a separating equilibrium exists with
PAM). Therefore, both the average exit rate from unemployment and the
entry wage fall with the duration of unemployment because the composition
of the pool of unemployed workers deteriorates over time. Furthermore, sep-
arating worker types may be costly, where firms that target skilled workers
may have to over-invest in order to discourage applications from unskilled
workers. In this case, the equilibrium allocation is not constrained efficient.
Another interpretation of the sorting explanation is that firms observe
the applicant’s type and base their recruiting decision on this information.
However, if a worker’s type is not contractible, our results would still hold
in this alternative setting.
Appendix
Surplus and Wage Determination
To determine wages as a Nash-bargaining solution, we need to add some
details to our setting. A type-s employed worker obtains the flow wage
ws(k) and becomes displaced at rate λ. The employment value is defined
as
r Es(k) = ws(k) + λ[Us − Es(k)]. (A1)
Analogously, the value of a filled vacancy is determined by the following
functional equation:
r Js(k) = F(k, s) − ck − ws(k) − λJs(k). (A2)
The net surplus is defined as Ss(k) ≡ Js(k) + Es(k) −Us . Using the above
expressions for the value functions, the functional equation (A2) for the
surplus value function is obtained.
After matching, a firm and a worker set the wage through Nash bar-
gaining. Let α denote the bargaining power of the worker. The equilibrium
wage is the solution of the following problem:
max
w
[Es(k) −Us]α[Js(k) − V ]1−α. (A3)
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This solution is characterized by Js(k) = (1 − α)Ss(k). By using the latter
equation to replace the value Js in the above Bellman equation (A2), it is
concluded that the equilibrium wages are determined as
ws(k) = α[F(k, s) − ck] + (1 − α)rUs . (A4)
Thus, workers obtain a proportion α and firms receive the remaining 1 − α
of the surplus of the match, in addition to the unemployment value rUs .
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a submarket k such that γ (k, ) ≥ 0,
γ (k, h) > 0, and Q(k) > 0. Using the functional equations (1) and (2),
the following expression is obtained:
{r + λ + αν[Q(k)]}[Sh(k) − S(k)] ≥ F(k, h) − F(k, ). (A5)
The right-hand side of this inequality is strictly positive because skilled
workers are more productive. Therefore, the surplus gap is positive, Sh(k) >
S(k). 
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is obtained by contradiction. Sup-
pose that there is an equilibrium where a submarket k is active and
γ (k, ), γ (k, h) > 0. According to Lemma 1, S(k) < Sh(k). Both types
of workers enter submarket k, so we have
rUs = αν[Q(k)]Ss(k), for s ∈ {, h}. (A6)
The expected profits of firms are defined by expression (3) and the average
ex post profits across worker types.
Consider now the alternative submarket k ′, where k ′ ≡ k +  and  are
arbitrarily small and positive. By differentiating expression (A6) with re-
spect to k, we obtain
∂qs
∂k
= ν[Q(k)]
ν ′[Q(k)]
−[Fk(k, s) − c]
Ss(k)(r + λ) , for s ∈ {, k}, (A7)
where ∂qs/∂k measures how much the queue length needs to change to
keep a worker of type s indifferent between submarkets k and k ′. The
above expression considers that
(r + λ)dSs(k)
dk
= Fk(k, s) − c. (A8)
The capital–skill complementarity assumption implies that
dS(k)
dk
<
dSh(k)
dk
.
Recall that ν is a decreasing function. Consider two cases, as follows.
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Case 1 Suppose that k ∈ [k¯, k¯h]. Then, −[Fk(k, h) − c] ≤ 0 ≤
−[Fk(k, ) − c]. Therefore, ∂qh/∂k ≥ 0 ≥ ∂q/∂k, which has
at least one strict inequality. Unlike the skilled workers, unskilled
workers must be compensated with a higher job-finding rate to
make them indifferent between k and k ′.
Case 2 Suppose now that k¯h < k. Then, 0 < −[Fk(k, h) − c] <
−[Fk(k, ) − c]. It follows that ∂q/∂k < ∂qh/∂k < 0. The
queue length must decrease more for unskilled workers so they
are indifferent between k and k ′.
In both cases, firms that deviate to submarket k ′ achieve a discrete jump
in profits because low-ability workers do not apply to k ′ and S(k) < Sh(k).
Therefore, we find a contradiction in either case; hence, submarket k cannot
be active at equilibrium. 
Proof of the Existence of the Equilibrium
We proceed according to several steps. First, we focus on the necessary
conditions that the equilibrium allocation must satisfy for type- workers
and we then consider the skilled. Second, we establish that these conditions
are also sufficient and we state the existence of an equilibrium.
First, we state and prove the following result.
Claim A1. Let k be a submarket such that either γ (k, ) > 0 or γ (k, h) >
0. Then, ∑
s
γ (k, s)(1 − α)Ss(k) ≥ (1 − α)S(k). (A9)
Proof: Expression (A9) is equivalent to
[1 − γ (k, )]Sh(k) ≥ [1 − γ (k, )]S(k). (A10)
We analyze two cases. If γ (k, ) = 1, then expression (A10) holds with
equality. Otherwise, if γ (k, ) < 1, then the inequality holds because of
Lemma 1. 
Now, we consider problem (P).
Proposition A1. Let {G, K , Q, , {Us,Ss}s} be an equilibrium. If an active
submarket k ∈ K exists such that q ≡ Q(k) > 0 and γ (k, ) > 0, then
the vector (q, k) is the unique solution of problem (P) and the system of
equations (4) and (5).
Proof: First, it is shown that for any k ∈ K such that q ≡ Q(k) > 0 and
γ (k, ) > 0, the pair [q,S(k)] solves the following problem (A11). Then,
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we prove that the solution of the problem is uniquely characterized by
conditions (4) and (5):
max
q∈[0,∞],S∈[0,S¯]
ν(q)S
subj. to η(q)(1 − α)S ≥ c0, (A11)
where S¯ ≡ maxk ′ S(k ′) is the maximum surplus. First, note that the Weier-
strass theorem applies to ensure the existence of a solution to this max-
imization problem; therefore, it is well defined. Similarly, Proposition
1 ensures that if k is an active submarket such that γ (k, ) > 0, then
γ (k, ) = 1. As a result, the second equilibrium condition implies that
the constraint on problem (A11) evaluated for the pair [q,S(k)] holds
with equality. We prove that this is a maximizer by contradiction. Suppose
that (q ′, S′) ∈ [0,∞] × [0, S¯] exists such that ν(q ′)αS′ > ν(q)αS(k), and
η(q ′)(1 − α)S′ ≥ c0. The continuity, monotonicity, and concavity of the
value function S are inherited from the production technology. Further,
the surplus reaches its maximum at k¯; hence, S¯ = S(k¯). By continu-
ity, k ′ ∈ [0, k¯] must exist such that S(k ′) = S′. By the definition of the
equilibrium beliefs, Q(k ′) ≥ q ′. Therefore,
η[Q(k ′)]
∑
s
γ (k ′, s)(1 − α)Ss(k ′) ≥ η[Q(k ′)](1 − α)S(k ′)
> η(q ′)(1 − α)S(k ′) ≥ c0,
where the first inequality comes from Claim A1, and the second inequality
results from the monotonicity of function η. This implies that a deviation
to submarket k ′ would be profitable. This contradicts the assumption that
k is an active submarket in equilibrium; therefore, the pair [q,S(k)] is a
solution to the problem (A11).
Now, we exploit the fact that the constraint must hold with equality to
rewrite the problem (A11) as
max
q∈[b,∞]
1/q,
where η(b) equals c0/[(1 − α)S¯]. Thus, the maximizer q is b, and k must
be k¯. Thus, conditions (4) and (5) hold at equilibrium, and the solution to
the problem (P) is unique. 
Now, consider the problem (Ph).
Proposition A2. Let {G, K , Q, , {Us,Ss}s} be an equilibrium. Consider
an active submarket kh such that qh ≡ Q(kh) > 0 and γ (kh, h) > 0. Then,
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the equilibrium vector (qh, kh) is the unique solution to the problem (Ph)
given U, which must satisfy the following conditions:
c0 = η(q)(1 − α) F(k, h) − ck
r + λ + αν(q) (A12)
and
k = k¯h, if ν(q)αS(k) ≤ rU; (A13)
otherwise,
k > k¯h and ν(q)αS(k) = rU. (A14)
Proof: First, arguing by contradiction, it is shown that for any active
submarket k ∈ K such that q ≡ Q(k) > 0 and γ (k, h) > 0, the vector (q, k)
solves problem (Ph) given the value U.
Proposition 1 ensures that if k is such that γ (k, h) > 0, then γ (k, h) = 1.
As a result, the second equilibrium condition implies that the first con-
straint on problem (Ph) holds with equality. The third equilibrium condi-
tion ensures that the second constraint also holds given the equilibrium
value U when evaluated for the pair (q, k). Therefore, the pair (q, k)
belongs to the constraint set. Now, suppose that (q ′, k ′) exists such that
ν(q ′)αSh(k ′) > ν(q)αSh(k), and the two constraints on problem (Ph) hold.
Here, ν is a decreasing continuous function, so q˜ > q ′ must exist such
that ν (˜q)αSh(k ′) = ν(q)αSh(k). By the definition of the equilibrium be-
liefs, Q(k ′) ≥ q˜. Therefore, the type- workers must be strictly worse off
in submarket k ′ because ν[Q(k ′)]αS(k ′) < ν(q ′)αS(k ′) ≤ rU, and it fol-
lows that γ (k ′, ) = 0. Therefore,
η[Q(k ′)]
∑
s
γ (k ′, s)(1 − α)Ss(k ′) = η[Q(k ′)](1 − α)Sh(k ′)
> η(q ′)(1 − α)Sh(k ′) ≥ c0.
This result contradicts the assumption that submarket k is active in equilib-
rium because the deviation of a firm to submarket k ′ would be profitable.
Thus, the equilibrium pair (q, k) is a solution to problem (Ph).
Now, the existence and uniqueness of a solution to problem (Ph) is
demonstrated. Because of the continuity of the objective function and the
compactness of the constraint set of the problem, the Weierstrass theorem
is applied to ensure the existence of a solution. Indeed, the constraint set
is non-empty because the pair q = ∞ and k = k¯h (for example) satisfies
both constraints.
Later, it is shown that any solution satisfies the first constraint with
equality. Then, by using the constraint to replace the surplus from the
objective function, as in the proof of Proposition A1, the problem can be
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rewritten as maximizing function 1/q subject to the two constraints on
problem (Ph). Therefore, the maximizer is the minimum feasible queue
length. Hence, a unique solution exists for q and k. It is straightforward
to show that the solution k must be greater than k¯; otherwise, we would
obtain a contradiction by increasing k by an arbitrarily small amount. This
is the case because it can be argued along the same lines as the proof of
Lemma 1 that Sh(k) > S(k).
To characterize the solution of problem (Ph), we define the Lagrangian
as
L = ν(q)αSh(k) + ξ1[η(q)(1 − α)Sh(k) − c0] − ξ2[ν(q)αS(k) − rU],
where ξ1 and ξ2 denote the non-negative multipliers associated with the
first and second constraints, respectively. The Kuhn–Tucker (necessary)
conditions are
ν ′(q)α[Sh(k) − ξ2S(k)] + ξ1η′(q)(1 − α)Sh(k) ≤ 0, q ≥ 0
qν ′(q)α[Sh(k) − ξ2S(k)] + qξ1η′(q)(1 − α)Sh(k) = 0, (A15)
dSh(k)
dk
[ν(q)α + ξ1η(q)(1 − α)] − ξ2ν(q)α dS(k)
dk
≤ 0, k ≥ 0,
k
dSh(k)
dk
[ν(q)α + ξ1η(q)(1 − α)] − kξ2ν(q)α dS(k)
dk
= 0, (A16)
η(q)(1 − α)Sh(k) ≥ c0, ξ1 ≥ 0, and ξ1[η(q) (1 − α)Sh(k) − c0] = 0,
(A17)
ν(q)αS(k) ≤ rU, ξ2 ≥ 0, and ξ2[ν(q)αS(k) − rU] = 0. (A18)
This set of complementary slackness conditions allows the characterization
of the solution to the problem. The case where ξ2 = 0 is analogous to
that studied in the proof of Proposition A1 (i.e., k = k¯h and the necessary
condition (A12) holds). Furthermore, the second constraint on the problem
(Ph) must also hold for the solution pair (q, x).
Now, suppose that ξ2 > 0, then the second constraint must be binding ac-
cording to the complementary slackness condition (A18). This implies that
q ∈ (0,∞). Next, it is shown by contradiction that the first constraint also
cannot be slack in this case. Suppose that ξ1 = 0 and η(q)(1 − α)Sh(k) >
c0. It follows from condition (A15) that Sh(k) = ξ2S(k), and from con-
dition (A16), we obtain dSh(k)/dk = ξ2[dS(k)/dk]. As we argued above,
k > k¯, so dS(k)/dk < 0 implies that dSh(k)/dk < 0 and ξ2 < 1. There-
fore, Sh(k) < S(k), which is not true. As a result, condition (A12) holds.
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Finally, the necessary condition (A16) together with dS(k)/dk < 0 leads
to dSh(k)/dk < 0 (i.e., k > k¯h). 
Now, it is shown that a solution to the set of problems (Ps)s partici-
pates in an equilibrium allocation, and the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium allocation are proven. The proof of Proposition 2 then follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let (qs, ks) be the vector solution of problem (Ps),
where
Ss(ks) = F(ks, s) − cks
r + λ + αν(qs)
and rUs = ν(qs)αSs(ks). We prove that it participates in an equilibrium
allocation. An equilibrium is a tuple {G, K , Q, , {Us,Ss}s} that satisfies
the equilibrium definition.
We define K ≡ {k, kh}. The surplus function is determined by the func-
tional equation (2) and the above unemployment values. The remaining
equilibrium objects are set in a manner consistent with the equilibrium
definition:
dGψ (k) ≡
⎧⎨
⎩
(1 − μ)u/q, if k = k,
μuh/qh, if k = kh,
0, otherwise,
where us ≡ λ/[λ + ν(qs)]. By construction, the distribution G trivially en-
sures that the last equilibrium condition holds. The beliefs for all off-the-
equilibrium k are defined as
Q(k) ≡ max
s
qˆs(k),
γ (k, ) =
{
1, if qˆ(k) > qˆh(k),
0, otherwise,
and
γ (k, h) =
{
1, if qˆh(k) ≥ qˆ(k),
0, otherwise,
where
qˆs(k) ≡
{
q, such that ν(q)αSs(k) = rUs, if Ss(k) > 0,
0, otherwise.
Note that the beliefs are well defined given the assumptions on the
matching function ν and there is no submarket k such that both types of
workers enter simultaneously.
Next, it is shown that firms maximize their profits, which are zero at
equilibrium in all active submarkets. It is then proven that workers search
optimally for jobs.
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The proofs of Propositions A1 and A2 show that the free-entry condition
holds in each active submarket. By contradiction, it is proven that firms
maximize their profits by entering either of the active submarkets in K .
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 Suppose that a submarket k ′ exists such that Q(k ′) > 0, γ (k ′, ) =
1, and η[Q(k ′)](1 − α)S(k ′) > c0. To attract unskilled workers,
it must be the case that ν[Q(k ′)]αS(k ′) = rU. Because of the
continuity and monotonicity of function η, q ′ < Q(k ′) exists such
that η(q ′)(1 − α)S(k ′) = c0. Here, ν is a decreasing function of
the queue length, so it follows that
ν(q)αS(k) = ν[Q(k ′)]αS(k ′) < ν(q ′)αS(k ′),
which contradicts the assumption that (q, k) is the maximizer
of problem (P). Therefore, there is no profitable deviation that
attracts only unskilled workers.
Case 2 Suppose that a submarket k ′ exists such that Q(k ′) > 0, γ (k ′, h) =
1, and η[Q(k ′)](1 − α)Sh(k ′) > c0. Skilled workers enter the sub-
market if
ν[Q(k ′)]αSh(k ′) = rUh = ν(qh)αSh(kh).
Furthermore, the next inequality follows from the off-the-
equilibrium beliefs defined above,
ν[Q(k ′)]αS(k ′) ≤ rU.
We distinguish two subcases. First, if the latter inequality is strict,
then q ′ < Q(k ′) must exist such that the two constraints on prob-
lem (Ph) hold at (q ′, k ′). Because of the properties of the matching
technology, it is found that ν(q ′)(1 − α)Sh(k ′) > rUh , which contra-
dicts the assumption that (qh, kh) is the maximizer of problem (Ph).
Second, if the inequality is indeed an equality, then it can be argued
along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 1 that a submarket
k ′′ exists, which differs from k ′ by an arbitrarily small amount,
such that the first constraint on problem (Ph) holds, the sec-
ond holds with strict inequality, and ν[Q(k ′′)](1 − α)Sh(k ′′) = rUh ,
which leads us back to the first case.
It remains to be demonstrated that the equilibrium condition that workers
search optimally. This is the case by the construction of the equilibrium
expectations functions. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let U˜ ≡ ν(q¯s)αS(k¯s) denote the expected discounted
utility of a type- worker conditional on applying to submarket (k¯s, q¯s).
26
This pair is uniquely defined by the system of equations
η(q¯s)(1 − α) F(k¯s, s) − ck¯s
r + λ + αν(q¯s) = c0
Fk(k, s) = c.
The second equation determines a unique capital level k¯s as a function of
type s, so we insert this into the first condition to obtain a single equation,
which relates q¯s and s. By differentiating this with respect to s, we obtain
dq¯s
ds
= − g(q¯s)
g′(q¯s)
d[F(k¯s, s) − ck¯s]/ds
F(k¯s, s) − ck¯s
< 0, (A19)
where g(q) ≡ η(q)/[r + λ + αν(q)] is increasing in q. This derivative is
negative because of the capital–skill complementarity.
To investigate the effects of an arbitrarily small skill difference on U˜(s),
we evaluate the total derivative at s = , where
dU˜
ds
= ∂U˜
∂q¯s
dq¯s
ds
+ ∂U˜
∂ k¯s
dk¯s
ds
= ν ′(q¯s)αS(k¯s)dq¯s
ds
+ ν(q¯s)∂S(k¯s)
∂ k¯s
dk¯s
ds
.
Note that the last term vanishes as ∂S(k¯s)/∂ k¯s = 0 when evaluated at k¯.
Therefore, the total derivative is positive and unskilled workers are better
off applying for a type-h job if firms do not over-invest when the skill
differences are sufficiently small. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Conditions (4), (5), and (A12)–(A14) characterize
the equilibrium outcome. According to these equilibrium conditions, it is
always the case that k < kh .
The conditions (4) and (A12) can be rewritten as
η(q)S(k) = η(qh)Sh(kh). (A20)
If kh = k¯h , then this expression can be written as g(q)[F(k, ) − ck] =
g(qh)[F(kh, h) − ckh], where g is an increasing function. The properties
of the production technology ensure that F(k, ) − ck < F(kh, h) − ckh .
Therefore, q > qh . Otherwise, if kh > k¯h , then condition (A14) holds. As
S(kh) < S(k), it follows that q > qh .
The queue length gap and expression (A20) imply that S(k) < Sh(kh).
Then, it follows directly from the definition of the unemployment value
(1) that U < Uh . Finally, by manipulating the wage and surplus equa-
tions, we can write the wages as ws = [r + λ + ν(qs)]αSs(ks), and thus
w < wh . 
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Proof of Proposition 4: A type-s worker is unemployed for an exact
period of length τ with probability e−τν(qs )ν(qs). The average exit rate
from unemployment at duration τ amounts to
ν¯(τ ) = μuhe
−τν(qh )ν(qh) + (1 − μ)ue−τν(q)ν(q)
μuhe−τν(qh ) + (1 − μ)ue−τν(q) . (A21)
We can proceed in an analogous manner for the average re-employment
wage at duration τ . The average wage for new matches conditional on an
unemployment period of length τ is determined by
w¯(τ ) = μuhe
−τν(qh )ν(qh)wh + (1 − μ)ue−τν(q)ν(q)w
μuhe−τν(qh )ν(qh) + (1 − μ)ue−τν(q)ν(q) . (A22)
Next, we show the steps for the average exit rate but we skip the proofs
for the average wages because they are analogous.
First, we differentiate expression (A21) with respect to the duration to
obtain
d ν¯(τ )
dτ
= − x[ν(qh) − ν(q)]
2eτ [ν(qh )−ν(q)]
{1 + xeτ [ν(qh )−ν(q)]}2 ,
where x ≡ (1 − μ/μ)(u/uh). According to Proposition 3, the derivative is
negative and thus the average exit rate falls over the unemployment period.
To show that this variable flattens out for long spells, it is sufficient to
compute the limit of the derivative as τ goes to infinity:
lim
τ→∞
d ν¯(τ )
dτ
= lim
z→∞ −
z
(1 + xz)2 = 0.
Finally, to analyze the curvature of the average exit rate, the second deriva-
tive is computed:
d2ν¯(τ )
dτ 2
= [ν(qh) − ν(q)]
2{xeτ [ν(qh )−ν(q)] − 1}
{1 + xeτ [ν(qh )−ν(q)]}3 .
The second derivative is positive if and only if eτ [ν(qh )−ν(q)] > 1/x . There-
fore, there is one inflection point at most. A sufficient condition that the
average exit rate is always convex is μ ≤ 0.5. 
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